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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for illegal guns
26 results foundAuthor: Violence Policy Center Title: Indicted: Types of Firearms and Methods of Gun Trafficking from the United States to Mexico as Revealed in U.S. Court Documents Summary: Increasing public attention is focusing on the role of the U.S. civilian firearms markets as a major source of guns supplied to the Mexican drug cartels responsible for the escalating violence on the U.S.-Mexico border. Aided by restrictions - endorsed by the National Rifle Association and implemented by Congress - on the release of federal crime gun trace data and a longstanding lack of detained information on gun commerce (both legal and illegal) in America, the gun lobby has claimed that Mexican drug lords are solely using true military weapons, not their civilian counterparts, and that such guns do not come from the U.S. civilian firearms market. This report, based on indictments and criminal information filed in U.S. district courts in the southwest United States, refutes the gun lobby's claims. The information contained in these government documents demonstrates - by the make, model, caliber, manufacturer, and retail source of firearms seized in criminal trafficking cases - that the military-style semiautomatic firearms easily available on the U.S. civilian gun market are a significant component of the weapons being trafficked to, and utilized by, the Mexican cartels. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2009. 23p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116304 Keywords: Gun ViolenceIllegal GunsMexican Drug CartelsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: A Blueprint for Federal Action on Illegal Guns: Regulation, Enforcement, and Best Practices to Combat Illegal Gun Trafficking Summary: For many years, leaders of the gun lobby have urged law enforcement professionals to “enforce the laws on the books.” Elected officials of all political stripes have joined that call. While the 450-plus members of Mayors Against Illegal Guns believe that Congress needs to close major gaps in federal laws, we believe with equal strength that the executive branch needs to more effectively enforce existing gun laws. The coalition has identified 40 opportunities in six areas where the Administration could enhance enforcement of existing laws without Congressional action. These recommendations would dramatically improve law enforcement’s ability to keep guns out of the hands of criminals – and, in doing so, save innocent lives, including the lives of police officers. Details: S.L.: 2009. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2010 at: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/blueprint_federal_action.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/blueprint_federal_action.pdf Shelf Number: 117623 Keywords: Gun ControlGun TraffickingGunsIllegal Guns |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Issue Brief: The Movement of Illegal Guns Across the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: In recent years, the escalating drug cartel violence in Mexico has claimed tens of thousands of lives, fueled in part by thousands of guns illegally trafficked from the United States. In fact, 90% of guns recovered and traced from Mexican crime scenes originated from gun dealers in the United States. This report relies primarily on previously unreleased trace data provided by Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) to Mayors Against Illegal Guns to describe which states are the predominant suppliers of those guns recovered and traced in Mexico. This new data shows that four in ten of the U.S. guns recovered in Mexico between 2006 and 2009 were originally sold by gun dealers in Texas. The three other states that share a border with Mexico – Arizona, California, and New Mexico – were the source for another one-third of the U.S. guns. To better understand the flow of guns into Mexico, this report also studies the rate at which states supply Mexican crime guns by controlling for population. When using this control, gun dealers in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas each supply crime guns to Mexico at rates at least 169% greater than any other state and at a rate more than three times as high as the fourth border state, California. In addition to proximity to the border, relatively lax gun laws in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas may contribute to that disparity. Additionally, the time between the original sale of guns at U.S. gun dealers and the recovery of those guns at Mexican crime scenes is decreasing – a sign of ever more sophisticated gun trafficking. Details: (S.l.): Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2010. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2010 at: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/issue_brief_mexico_2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/issue_brief_mexico_2010.pdf Shelf Number: 119893 Keywords: Drug CartelsGun ControlGun TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal Guns |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Trace the Guns: The Link Between Gun Laws and Interstate Gun Trafficking Summary: Every year, tens of thousands of guns make their way into the hands of criminals through illegal trafficking channels. These firearms contribute to the more than 12,000 gun murders in the United States each year. This report seeks to explain where crime guns originate, where they are recovered in crimes, and whether state gun laws help curb the flow of these illegal weapons. Details: S.l.: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/trace_the_guns_report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/trace_the_guns_report.pdf Shelf Number: 119944 Keywords: Gun ControlGun TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal GunsIllegal Weapons |
Author: SEESAC (South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons) Title: 'The Rifle Has the Devil Inside': Gun Culture in South Eastern Europe Summary: SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons)control stakeholders and practitioners within South Eastern Europe (SEE) are often told that weapon registration and collection programmes are ineffective because guns are an intrinsic part of ‘cultures’ in the region. In addition, international and local observers often explain high levels of gun ownership and use in SEE by stating there is a strong ‘gun culture’. In contrast, survey results on the public’s perception of guns, suggest that ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ are not principal reasons for gun ownership in the region. Thus, it is a matter of continued debate to what extent and which types of gun ownership and use are rendered acceptable and legitimate by certain cultural beliefs and practices. This report examines how cultural beliefs and practices influence gun ownership and use in SEE, and how these might affect SALW control interventions. An anthropological approach was taken to better understand the reasons for civilian gun ownership and use, and the ways in which society represents these behaviours, in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (including the UN Administered Territory of Kosovo). A wide variety of research tools were used including household surveys (HHS) conducted by SEESAC and UNDP, focus group transcripts, secondary literature searches, statistical data, anthropological field studies, the Internet, print and electronic media. The report concludes that the motivations and reasons for gun ownership and use in SEE are complex and suggests that cultural practices and beliefs do not play a central role in justifying gun ownership and use in SEE. There are pockets of culturally motivated gun related behaviours, in very localised areas, which have historical roots, such as celebratory gunfire in the mountainous areas of the peninsula (parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Northern Albania). However, more important are the ways that ‘traditional’ customs and values have interplayed with other factors such as the political or socio-economic situation, or the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. People’s behaviours involving guns, and their perceptions of guns, are more to do with the relatively widespread availability of weapons, weak and ineffective law enforcement and the reinvention of history and folklore for political means. Over the years guns have been associated with masculinity and have been a means of defining male attributes but they are not so significant now for ideas of masculinity although gun related activities remain male-oriented. The way guns are represented today, and how society perceives them is largely influenced by the media and how it portrays gun owners and gun use, especially the actions of high profile organizations or individuals who are associated with guns, such as the police, politicians and prominent business people. In general, ‘traditional’ and ‘cultural’ motivations for gun ownership and use in SEE are unlikely to be the principal barriers to SALW control interventions. Security considerations are much more likely to play a significant role with many people unwilling to give up their weapons, which they perceive as providers of security and protection, until they are satisfied that the state can be trusted to provide for their needs. Whilst there are still relatively high crime levels, the unresolved status of territory i.e. the UN Administered Territory of Kosovo, uncertain futures and interethnic distrust (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Southern Serbia and to some extent in Montenegro and Moldova) there will be people who feel that they are justified in keeping their guns. Details: Belgrade: SEESAC, 2006. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/eu_pdf/europe-regional-2006-b.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Europe URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/eu_pdf/europe-regional-2006-b.pdf Shelf Number: 119948 Keywords: Gun ControlGun ViolenceGunsHomicidesIllegal Guns |
Author: Kessler, Jim Title: Missing Records: Holes in Background Check System Allow Illegal Buyers to Get Guns Summary: This report, issued in the wake of the nation’s worst-ever mass shooting at Virginia Tech, updates a 2002 look at the records in background check system. We conclude that the system has improved in the last five years, but as evidenced by Seung-Hui Cho’s ability to pass two firearms purchase background checks, major holes remain. For example, 91% of those who should be barred by virtue of their mental illness (like Cho) are not in the system. Details: Washington, DC: The Third Way, 2007. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 15, 2011 at: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/69/Third_Way_Report_-_Missing_Records_-_Holes_in_the_Background_Check_System_-_How_They_Allow_Illegal_Buyers_to_Get_Guns.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/69/Third_Way_Report_-_Missing_Records_-_Holes_in_the_Background_Check_System_-_How_They_Allow_Illegal_Buyers_to_Get_Guns.pdf Shelf Number: 121362 Keywords: Gun ControlGun ViolenceGunsIllegal Guns |
Author: Burrell, William D. Title: Guns, Safety and Proactive Supervision: Involving Probation and Parole in Project Safe Neighborhoods Summary: The information in this monograph is intended to raise concerns and issues that agencies and officers should consider in decisions about proactive supervision as it relates to dealing with prohibited offenders who may possess guns. The document does not prescribe a template or model for this. Rather, agencies and officers may wish to use the document as a center of discussion on policies and procedures, especially with the agency’s legal counsel who is in the position to advise them on federal, state, and local laws that apply to the practice of supervision. The primary purpose of this monograph is to provide probation, parole, community supervision officers, and their agencies with a framework to assist them in planning, implementing, and enhancing services provided to offenders who may possess firearms. Information provided will neither endorse nor oppose the carrying of weapons by supervising officers. Further, references to matters of law are not intended to be legal interpretations and agencies should consult with legal counsel relative to the development of policies and procedures. Details: Lexington, KY: American Probation and Parole Association, 2008. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2011 at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/APPA_PSN.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/APPA_PSN.pdf Shelf Number: 122099 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeIllegal GunsParole SupervisionProbation SupervisionWeapons |
Author: Issa, Darrell E. Title: The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents Summary: In the fall of 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) developed a risky new strategy to combat gun trafficking along the Southwest Border. The new strategy directed federal law enforcement to shift its focus away from seizing firearms from criminals as soon as possible — and to focus instead on identifying members of trafficking networks. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) implemented that strategy using a reckless investigative technique that street agents call “gunwalking.” ATF’s Phoenix Field Division began allowing suspects to walk away with illegally purchased guns. The purpose was to wait and watch, in the hope that law enforcement could identify other members of a trafficking network and build a large, complex conspiracy case. This shift in strategy was known and authorized at the highest levels of the Justice Department. Through both the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Arizona and “Main Justice,” headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Department closely monitored and supervised the activities of the ATF. The Phoenix Field Division established a Gun Trafficking group, called Group VII, to focus on firearms trafficking. Group VII initially began using the new gunwalking tactics in one of its investigations to further the Department’s strategy. The case was soon renamed “Operation Fast and Furious,” and expanded dramatically. It received approval for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) funding on January 26, 2010. ATF led a strike force comprised of agents from ATF, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The operation’s goal was to establish a nexus between straw purchasers of assault-style weapons in the United States and Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating on both sides of the United States-Mexico border. Straw purchasers are individuals who are legally entitled to purchase firearms for themselves, but who unlawfully purchase weapons with the intent to transfer them into the hands of DTOs or other criminals. Operation Fast and Furious was a response to increasing violence fostered by the DTOs in Mexico and their increasing need to purchase ever-growing numbers of more powerful weapons in the U.S. An integral component of Fast and Furious was to work with gun shop merchants, or “Federal Firearms Licensees” (FFLs) to track known straw purchasers through the unique serial number of each firearm sold. ATF agents entered the serial numbers of the weapons purchased into the agency’s Suspect Gun Database. These weapons bought by the straw purchasers included AK-47 variants, Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, and the FN Five-seveN. During Fast and Furious, ATF frequently monitored actual transactions between the FFLs and straw purchasers. After the purchases, ATF sometimes conducted surveillance of these weapons with assistance from local police departments. Such surveillance included following the vehicles of the straw purchasers. Frequently, the straw purchasers transferred the weapons they bought to stash houses. In other instances, they transferred the weapons to third parties. The volume, frequency, and circumstances of these transactions clearly established reasonable suspicion to stop and question the buyers. Agents are trained to use such interactions to develop probable cause to arrest the suspect or otherwise interdict the weapons and deter future illegal purchases. Operation Fast and Furious sought instead to allow the flow of guns from straw purchasers to the third parties. Instead of trying to interdict the weapons, ATF purposely avoided contact with known straw purchasers or curtailed surveillance, allowing guns to fall into the hands of criminals and bandits on both sides of the border. Though many line agents objected vociferously, ATF and DOJ leadership continued to prevent them from making every effort to interdict illegally purchased firearms. Instead, leadership’s focus was on trying to identify additional conspirators, as directed by the Department’s strategy for combating Mexican Drug Cartels. ATF and DOJ leadership were interested in seeing where these guns would ultimately end up. They hoped to establish a connection between the local straw buyers in Arizona and the Mexico-based DTOs. By entering serial numbers from suspicious transactions into the Suspect Gun Database, ATF would be quickly notified as each one was later recovered at crime scenes and traced, either in the United States or in Mexico. The Department’s leadership allowed the ATF to implement this flawed strategy, fully aware of what was taking place on the ground. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona encouraged and supported every single facet of Fast and Furious. Main Justice was involved in providing support and approving various aspects of the Operation, including wiretap applications that would necessarily include painstakingly detailed descriptions of what ATF knew about the straw buyers it was monitoring. This hapless plan allowed the guns in question to disappear out of the agency’s view. As a result, this chain of events inevitably placed the guns in the hands of violent criminals. ATF would only see these guns again after they turned up at a crime scene. Tragically, many of these recoveries involved loss of life. While leadership at ATF and DOJ no doubt regard these deaths as tragic, the deaths were a clearly foreseeable result of the strategy. Both line agents and gun dealers who cooperated with the ATF repeatedly expressed concerns about that risk, but ATF supervisors did not heed those warnings. Instead, they told agents to follow orders because this was sanctioned from above. They told gun dealers not to worry because they would make sure the guns didn’t fall into the wrong hands. Unfortunately, ATF never achieved the laudable goal of dismantling a drug cartel. In fact, ATF never even got close. After months and months of investigative work, Fast and Furious resulted only in indictments of 20 straw purchasers. Those indictments came only after the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. The indictments, filed January 19, 2011, focus mainly on what is known as “lying and buying.” Lying and buying involves a straw purchaser falsely filling out ATF Form 4473, which is to be completed truthfully in order to legally acquire a firearm. Even worse, ATF knew most of the indicted straw purchasers to be straw purchasers before Fast and Furious even began. In response to criticism, ATF and DOJ leadership denied allegations that gunwalking occurred in Fast and Furious by adopting an overly narrow definition of the term. They argue that gunwalking is limited to cases in which ATF itself supplied the guns directly. As field agents understood the term, however, gunwalking includes situations in which ATF had contemporaneous knowledge of illegal gun purchases and purposely decided not to attempt any interdiction. The agents also described situations in which ATF facilitated or approved transactions to known straw buyers. Both situations are even more disturbing in light of the ATF’s certain knowledge that weapons previously purchased by the same straw buyers had been trafficked into Mexico and may have reached the DTOs. When the full parameters of this program became clear to the agents assigned to Group VII, a rift formed among Group VII’s agents in Phoenix. Several agents blew the whistle on this reckless operation only to face punishment and retaliation from ATF leadership. Sadly, only the tragic murder of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry provided the necessary impetus for DOJ and ATF leadership to finally indict the straw buyers whose regular purchases they had monitored for 14 months. Even then, it was not until after whistleblowers later reported the issue to Congress that the Justice Department finally issued a policy directive that prohibited gunwalking. This report is the first in a series regarding Operation Fast and Furious. Possible future reports and hearings will likely focus on the actions of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona, the decisions faced by gun shop owners (FFLs) as a result of ATF’s actions, and the remarkably ill-fated decisions made by Justice Department officials in Washington, especially within the Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. This first installment focuses on ATF’s misguided approach of letting guns walk. The report describes the agents’ outrage about the use of gunwalking as an investigative technique and the continued denials and stonewalling by DOJ and ATF leadership. It provides some answers as to what went wrong with Operation Fast and Furious. Further questions for key ATF and DOJ decision makers remain unanswered. For example, what leadership failures within the Department of Justice allowed this program to thrive? Who will be held accountable and when? Details: Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2011. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Joint Staff Report: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/ATF-06-14-11-Joint-Issa-Grassley-report-on-agent-findings.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/ATF-06-14-11-Joint-Issa-Grassley-report-on-agent-findings.pdf Shelf Number: 122129 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsGun ControlGun ViolenceGuns (U.S.)Illegal GunsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weaspons |
Author: Fox, James Alan Title: The Recent Surge in Homicides involving Young Black Males and Guns: Time to Reinvest in Prevention and Crime Control Summary: While overall homicide levels in the United States have fluctuated minimally in recent years, those involving young victims and perpetrators — particularly young black males — have surged. From 2002 to 2007, the number of homicides involving black male juveniles as victims rose by 31% and as perpetrators by 43%. In terms of gun killings involving this same population subgroup, the increases were even more pronounced: 54% for young black male victims and 47% for young black male perpetrators. The increase in homicide among black youth, coupled with a smaller increase or even decrease among their white counterparts, was consistently true for every region of the country and nearly all population groupings of cities. The pattern also held individually for a majority of states and major cities. After some decline during the 1990s, the percentage of homicides that involve a gun has increased since 2000, both among young white offenders and black offenders of all age ranges. The percentage of gun homicides for young black offenders has reached nearly 85%. These trends are concomitant with various legislative initiatives at the federal level that have lessened the extent of surveillance on illegal gun markets. Time-of-day patterns of violent crime victimization for youngsters, ages 6-17, reveal clear differences between school days and out-of-school periods. On school days, the risk spikes during the after-school hours — the primetime for juvenile crime---while the late evening hours are most problematic on non-school days, particularly summertime weekends. Future demographics suggest that the concern for at-risk youth should increase over the next decade. The number of black and Hispanic children should continue to expand, contrasting with the rather limited increase expected among Caucasian children. There is a significant need for reinvestment in children and families — in essence an at-risk youth bailout during these difficult economic times. Federal support for policing and youth violence prevention has declined sharply in recent years, perhaps precipitated by complacency brought about by the significant 1990s decline in crime. The resurgence in homicide, especially among minority youth, signals the importance of restoring federal funds for crime prevention and crime control. Details: Boston, MA: Northeastern University, 2008. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 9, 2011 at: http://www.jfox.neu.edu/Documents/Fox%20Swatt%20Homicide%20Report%20Dec%2029%202008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.jfox.neu.edu/Documents/Fox%20Swatt%20Homicide%20Report%20Dec%2029%202008.pdf Shelf Number: 122335 Keywords: African AmericansGun ViolenceHomicidesIllegal GunsViolent CrimeYouth Violence |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Fatal Gaps: How Missing Records in the Federal Background Check System Put Guns in the Hands of Killers Summary: Since its creation in 1999, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) has blocked more than 1.6 million permit applications and gun sales to felons, the seriously mentally ill, drug abusers and other dangerous people who are prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms. Completing the necessary paperwork for a background check takes a gun buyer mere minutes, and more than 91 percent of these electronic screens are completed instantaneously. And, amidst a polarized national debate about gun control, the background check system enjoys nearly universal public support. Despite its relative success, NICS has serious gaps and limitations that still allow firearms to be sold to dangerous people, including some of the nation’s worst mass murderers. The NICS database can access the names of individuals who are barred from possessing guns due to citizenship status and other prohibiting factors with relative ease. That data is regularly and efficiently shared among government and law enforcement agencies. But, for complex legal and logistical reasons discussed in this report, records about the kinds of serious mental health and drug abuse problems that disqualify people from gun ownership have proven more difficult to capture. In 2007, Seung Hui Cho shot and killed 32 people at Virginia Tech before taking his own life. More than a year earlier, a judge had found Cho to be mentally ill—a determination that should have barred him for life from possessing a firearm. But the records documenting his profound mental illness were never submitted to NICS, and Cho was able to pass several background checks before buying the guns he used in the mass shooting. On January 8, 2011 Jared Loughner shot and killed six people and critically wounded 13 others in Tucson, including Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. Media reports indicated that Loughner had a troubled past that included a drug-related arrest, an admission of drug use to the U.S. Army and suspension from community college for a pattern of disturbing behavior. He nevertheless passed background checks and bought firearms on two separate occasions, including the Glock 19 he used in his attempt to assassinate Congresswoman Giffords. News accounts suggested that Loughner’s admission of drug use should have barred him from purchasing his first gun, an assertion the government has never confirmed. After the Tucson mass shooting, Mayors Against Illegal Guns conducted an investigation to discover why critical mental health and drug abuse records are missing from the NICS database. We obtained Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data on the number of records states and federal agencies have shared with the system, analyzed related state and federal policies and interviewed more than 60 government officials responsible for NICS record collection and submission in 49 states and the District of Columbia. Based on our analysis and FBI data released on October 31, 2011, we drew the following conclusions: Millions of records identifying seriously mentally ill people and drug abusers as prohibited purchasers are missing from the federal background check database because of lax reporting by state agencies. • Many state mental health records are still missing: Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have submitted fewer than 100 mental health records to the federal database. Seventeen states have submitted fewer than ten mental health records, and four states have not submitted any records at all. • State substance abuse records are also underreported: Forty-four states have submitted fewer than ten records to the controlled substance file in the NICS Index, and 33 have not submitted any records at all. Even though federal regulations and policy establish that a failed drug test, single drug-related arrest or admission of drug use within the past year temporarily disqualify a person from possessing a gun, the vast majority of states are unaware that these records should be shared with NICS. • While still inadequate, mental health record reporting by the states has improved: From August 2010 to October 2011, the number of state-submitted mental health records in the federal background check database increased by 35.4 percent. • States with the highest rates of mental health record submission have typically enacted policies that require or permit reporting of records: Nine of the ten states that submit the most mental health records per capita have adopted laws or policies that mandate or permit the sharing of mental health records with NICS, while just two of the ten states that submit records at the lowest rates have such laws or policies. • States with access to federal funding tend to submit more records: From August 2010 to October 2011, the nine states that received NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) grants to improve NICS submission increased their rate of mental health record sharing by nearly twice as many records per capita as states with no federal funding. • Leadership makes a difference: In each state that has significantly improved at sharing records with the federal database, one or more state actors have taken the lead in identifying and surmounting the logistical, legal and political obstacles to compliance. Federal agencies are not reporting records to NICS despite a federal law requiring all federal agencies to report “any record of any person” who is prohibited from purchasing firearms to the FBI. • Federal agencies have shared very few mental health records: 52 of the 61 agencies for which the FBI keeps relevant data have reported no mental health records to NICS. The vast majority of federal records were submitted by just one agency—the Department of Veterans Affairs. • Most federal agencies have not submitted any substance abuse records: Only three federal agencies—the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Court Services and Offenders Supervision Agency (CSOSA)—have shared any substance abuse records with NICS, with the vast majority submitted by CSOSA. • A Clinton-era policy directive may discourage federal reporting: Federal agencies may continue to rely on a policy memorandum issued in 1994 by former Attorney General Janet Reno that instructs federal agencies not to submit certain substance abuse records to NICS. Details: S.l.: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2011 at: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/maig_mimeo_revb.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/maig_mimeo_revb.pdf Shelf Number: 123362 Keywords: Background ChecksCriminal RecordsGun ControlIllegal Guns |
Author: Cukier, Wency Title: The Illicit Trade in Small Arms: Addressing the Problem of Diversion Summary: Over the last decade, considerable attention has been paid to the global problem of the illicit trafficking of small arms. This paper will analyse the points of diversion and potential mechanisms to prevent diversion using a demand-and-supply framework. Concrete cases are examined to understand the contributing factors and ways in which the Programme of Action addresses these. The paper is structured in four parts: 1) Background, 2) Mechanisms of Diversion, 3) Measures to Reduce Diversion, and 4) Conclusions. The principal findings of the paper are: 1) Increasingly the evidence reaffirms the importance of understanding the root causes of political and criminal violence that drive the demand for illicit small arms. Where demand is strong because of acute insecurity, efforts to reduce diversion by increasing controls over the licit supply are less likely to be successful. Factors driving the demand for small arms include demographics, governance problems; weak and corrupt law enforcement; human rights violations; civil and identity conflicts and the failure of states to protect the vulnerable; social and economic disparities; inadequate post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; and cultural attitudes. 2) Although the definitions vary by context, “licit” small arms are those possessed by states, police, and civilians in accordance with existing international conventions as well as national laws. “Illicit” small arms are those which are possessed in violation of existing international conventions and/or national laws. These may include small arms in the hands of states that are subject to UN Security Council sanctions or regional/subregional embargos or moratoria, or small arms in the hands of non-state actors, as well as small arms illicitly possessed by civilians. The distinctions and interactions between licit and illicit are complex. Distinguishing between licit/ illicit small arms sales is a function of the status of the buyer (entitled or proscribed); the status of the seller (licensed or unlicensed); the status of the weapon (licit or illicit model, licitly acquired or stolen, licit/illicit manufacture); and the details of the transaction (formal or informal). 3) While in some regions there is local craft production of illicit small arms, most illicit small arms begin as licit small arms. Diversion occurs through a variety of means, including: illegal manufacture or reactivation of deactivated weapons, illicit sales by states, illegal brokering, illegal sales by dealers, illegal sales by civilians, theft from state and civilian stockpiles, and illicit importation. 4) A review of cases reveals a wide variety of mechanisms to facilitate illicit sales, including the absence of appropriate controls, falsification of documents and inadequate implementation, and a limited capacity for enforcement. 5) Measures that address licit trade, possession, and use—whether by states, police and other public security agents, or civilians—are essential to reduce the risk that licit small arms will be diverted to licit markets or purposes. A principal purpose of international sanctions and embargos, conventions, programs of action, and national regulations that follow from them is to reduce the risk that licit small arms will be diverted to illicit markets and purposes. Details: Ottawa: Peacebuild; Waterloo, ONT: Project Ploughshares, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://www.muntr.org/v4/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ADDRESSING-THE-PROBLEM-OF-DIVERSION.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.muntr.org/v4/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ADDRESSING-THE-PROBLEM-OF-DIVERSION.pdf Shelf Number: 124914 Keywords: Illegal GunsIllegal WeaponsSmall Arms Trafficking (Canada) |
Author: Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD) Title: A Human Security Concern: The Traffick, Use and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Caribbean Summary: This paper looks at the place of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a threat to Human Security with specific reference to the Caribbean context. The concept of Human Security for the purpose of this paper is not limited to a State centric realist definition of the concept. Human Security is interpreted and interrogated within a more people centred approach to the concept. The intent of this paper is to outline the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weight weapons within the framework of a compromised Human Security and as a hinderance to development. It further explores the major consideration of Human Security for the Small Island Developing States of the Caribbean region, investigating the political and economic development path as a contributor to and facilitator of this compromised security. Additionally, the unique geopolitics and economics of regional development and the space created for the proliferation of SALW is also looked at in terms of providing as holistic as possible an understanding of the factors which determine the mis-use of SALW within the region. In conclusion, the remedial work undertaken, both at the level of the State and non-State actors, specific to the social and economic fallout consistent with the proliferation and mis-use of SALW will be explored. The initiatives which seek to address the issue of SALW as a threat to human security at the national, regional and international levels. The overarching concerns of the paper are the place of gender within the Human Security and SALW dialogue and the place or impacts on the development agenda for these issues. Details: Trinidad and Tobago: Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD), 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Documentos-8.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Documentos-8.pdf Shelf Number: 125202 Keywords: Human Security (Caribbean)Illegal GunsIllegal WeaponsSmall Arms Trafficking (Caribbean) |
Author: Issa, Darrell Title: Memorandum: Update of Operation Fast and Furious Summary: Since February 2011, the House Oversight and Government and Government Reform Committee has been conducting a joint investigation with Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-IA) of reckless conduct in the Justice Department’s Operation Fast and Furious. The committee has held three hearings, conducted twenty-four transcribed interviews with fact witnesses, sent the Department of Justice over fifty letters, and issued the Department of Justice two subpoenas for documents. The Justice Department, however, continues to withhold documents critical to understanding decision making and responsibility in Operation Fast and Furious. This memo explains key events and facts in Operation Fast and Furious that have been uncovered during the congressional investigation; remaining questions that the Justice Department refused to cooperate in helping the Committee answer; the ongoing relevance of these questions; and the extent of the harm created by both Operation Fast and Furious and the Department’s refusal to fully cooperate. The memo also explains issues for Committee Members to consider in making a decision about holding Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt of Congress for his Department’s refusal to provide subpoenaed documents. Attached to this memo for review and discussion is a draft version of a contempt report that the Committee may consider at an upcoming business meeting. Details: Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2012. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2012 at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Update-on-Fast-and-Furious-with-attachment-FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Update-on-Fast-and-Furious-with-attachment-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 126084 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsGun ControlGun ViolenceGuns (U.S.)Illegal GunsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weaspons |
Author: Koper, Christopher S. Title: Police Strategies to Reduce Illegal Possession and Carrying of Firearms: Effects on Gun Crime Summary: Criminal misuse of firearms is among the world’s most serious crime problems. Strategies to reduce gun violence include efforts to restrict the manufacture and sale of firearms, interrupt the illegal supply of guns, deter gun possession, reduce gun carrying in public places, toughen responses to illegal gun use, reduce demand for firearms, promote responsible ownership of guns, and address community conditions that foster gun crime. In this review, we examine research on the effectiveness of selected law enforcement strategies for reducing gun crime and gun violence. This review examines the impacts of police strategies to reduce illegal possession and carrying of firearms on gun crime. Examples include gun detection patrols in high-crime areas, enhanced surveillance of probationers and parolees, weapon reporting hotlines, consent searches, and other similar tactics. Details: Oslo, Norway: Campbell Collaboration, 2012. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Campbell Systematic Reviews 2012:11: Accessed September 13, 2012 at: www.campbellcollaboration.org Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126329 Keywords: Gun ControlGun ViolenceIllegal GunsPolicing |
Author: Pierce, Glenn Title: New Approaches to Understanding and Regulating Primary and Secondary Illegal Firearms Summary: The major objective of this study is to enhance understanding of the characteristics and regulation of primary and secondary illegal firearms markets. The study has two major components: 1) a national study of illegal firearm markets based on ATF firearm trace data for all firearms recovered by law enforcement between 2003 and 2006, and 2) a California focused study based ATF traced firearms recovered in California between 2003 and 2006 that were crossed referenced with California Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) data to yield information on the last-known purchaser of a firearm. The national study was designed to: - Develop an enhanced understanding of illegal firearms markets using ATF trace data - Assess the potential impact of State firearm laws on firearms trafficking using ATF trace data The California analysis was designed to: • Enhance the tactical and strategic value of firearms trace data by tracing crime-related guns to last-known dealers/purchasers - Improve our overall understanding of illegal secondary markets The national study found that the stringency of state level firearms laws and regulations on time-to-crime and, in the case of California, the regular enforcement of state regulations lead to consistently longer time-to-crime for firearms recovered within their jurisdictions. These patterns persist for whether firearms were purchased within the recovery jurisdiction or in another state. With the addition, of other potential indicators of time-to-crime into the analysis, the effect of firearm laws is mediated in a manner that conforms to the expectations of how firearms regulations can operate to control the illegal distribution guns. Specifically, when dealer related variables are entered into the overall model of time-to-crime the effects of states with more stringent laws and regulations are reduced more than states without such laws, as would be expected given that state firearms laws and regulations should work through their regulation on dealers. In addition, a number of other potential determinants of time-to-crime have effects on time-to-crime that indicate they are potentially useful indicators of illegal firearms trafficking. The California analysis compared illegal firearm market characteristics using information from ATF trace data (based primarily on first-time, retail-sourced information) with illegal firearms market characteristics based on ATF trace data updated with California DROS information. This comparison revealed that including information on the last known purchaser of 2 a firearm significantly reduced the median time-to-crime of California-sourced crime guns relative to time-to-crime calculations based on standard ATF trace data. This finding indicates that guns sometimes move very rapidly from subsequent market transactions to use in crime. These finding suggest that enhanced firearm trace data can be very useful in guiding law enforcement actions against gun traffickers and criminals directly acquiring firearms through secondary market sources. Details: Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2013. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: New Approaches to Understanding and Regulating Primary and Secondary Illegal Firearms Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127610 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal Firearms Markets (U.S.)Illegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Goodman, Colby Title: U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Guatemala and Mexico: A Working Paper Summary: Following an 18-month joint investigation between the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. authorities arrested Joel Linares Soberanis, a Guatemalan national, Fernando Argenis Huezo, and Fernando's common-law wife, Jenni Otilia Cortez, on March 11, 2010 in Conroe, Texas on alleged drug and firearms related crimes. From September 2008 to early 2010, both Huezo and Cortez allegedly purchased scores of firearms at U.S. gun stores in Texas, including Glock semi-automatic pistols and AR-15 assault-type rifles, with the intention of sending them across the U.S. border. At least 15 of these firearms were recovered by law enforcement authorities in both Mexico and in Guatemala. Three of these firearms were found in Guatemala within two weeks of their purchase. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers discovered these activities when they noticed heroin in the drive shaft of a dodge pick-up truck owned by Huezo attempting to enter the United States. In July 2010, Cortez was sentenced to 45 months in prison for falsifying forms to buy a firearm. Although the above case highlights yet another example of U.S. firearms trafficking to Mexico, it also provides a glimpse into a relatively unknown phenomenon: the illicit movement of U.S.-origin firearms to Guatemala. While U.S. public attention has focused on arms, particularly hand and rocket propelled grenades, moving from Guatemala or El Salvador to Mexico, there has been little research into U.S. firearms flowing into Central America, particularly the northern triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Based largely on an ATF examination of just one Guatemalan military bunker with firearms recovered from FY 2006 to FY 2009, ATF determined that 2,687 of the 6,000 firearms (40 percent) had a nexus with the United States (either because the firearms were U.S. manufactured or U.S. imported). In the last few years, there have also been at least 34 U.S. prosecutions related to firearms trafficking to Guatemala involving a total of 604 U.S.-origin firearms trafficked. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2013 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/US%20Firearms%20to%20Guatemala%20and%20Mexico_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/US%20Firearms%20to%20Guatemala%20and%20Mexico_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129474 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons (Guatemala, Mexico) |
Author: Great Britain. National Crime Agency Title: National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2014 Summary: If there is a single cross-cutting issue that has changed the landscape for serious and organised crime and our response against it, it is the growth in scale and speed of internet communication technologies. The online streaming of real-time child sexual exploitation and abuse is a growing threat. Cyber techniques have proliferated and are used ever more extensively by wider serious and organised crime groups to commit 'traditional' crimes (see Section 1: Cross-cutting issues for cyber-enabled crime). As more government services go online, including tax collection, there is an increasing risk of online attacks and fraud against the public sector. Large scale attacks on public as well as private online services erode consumer confidence, which affects the UK's social and economic well-being and reduces the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business. 84% of all cases of identity fraud are delivered by the internet. The pace of development of deployable criminal tools is such that we anticipate an increase in the targeted compromise of UK networked systems, more ransom-ware attacks and distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks against business-critical systems. Corruption is another key cross-cutting issue, the impact of which is disproportionate to the level and frequency at which it occurs, with serious ramifications in terms of confidence towards the public and private sectors and in undermining trust in government. Proceeds of corruption and bribery amounting to millions of pounds from some international politically exposed persons (PEPs) have been laundered through UK financial systems including banks and investment property. The scale of the laundering of criminal proceeds, despite the UK's leading role in developing international standards to tackle it, is a strategic threat to the UK's economy and reputation. Some of the same financial transfer systems used by serious and organised criminals in the UK are also used by terrorist groups both domestically and overseas. The UK and its dependent territories are believed to have been the destination for billions of pounds of European criminal proceeds. We assess that the supply of heroin from Afghanistan, amphetamine processing/production in the UK and the supply of new psychoactive substances are all likely to increase, and that the supply of cocaine from South America is likely to remain at a high rate. The impact of the illegal drugs trade in the countries where they are sourced and those through which they are trafficked can be significant and undermines states and government structures. In some cases it has the potential to damage UK strategic partnerships. Human trafficking is widely recognised as a significant global problem. Work to scope the extent of criminality behind the trafficking of human beings continues in order to improve the understanding of modern slavery. We assess that irregular migrants already in the UK will continue to provide a pool of people that serious and organised criminals can exploit by selling them forged or counterfeit documents to support fraudulent applications for leave to remain in the UK. We also assess that criminal exploitation of the legitimate supply of firearms to the UK marketplace will increase. There is also a concern that weapons, whether from illegal or legitimate sources, might find their way into the hands of extremists. All of the most serious crime threats are transnational. Commodities of all types - including, for example, trafficked people destined for modern slavery, intangibles targeted in fraud and cyber crime - either come from or transit through often unstable countries. Corruption in these countries both feeds off the proceeds of the crime and contributes in turn to instability. The criminal exploitation of corrupt and unstable governments or countries can directly threaten UK national security. Details: London: National Crime Agency, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2014 at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file Shelf Number: 133466 Keywords: Child Sexual ExploitationCybercrimeDrug TraffickingHuman TraffickingIllegal DrugsIllegal GunsNational SecurityOnline VictimizationOrganized Crime (U.K.)Violent Crime |
Author: Chicago. Office of the Mayor Title: Tracing the Guns: The Impact of Illegal Guns on Violence in Chicago Summary: Gun violence is Chicago's most urgent problem. Since assuming office in 2011, Mayor Emanuel's top priority has been reducing crime so that all Chicagoans, in every neighborhood, feel safe in our City. The Mayor's comprehensive violence reduction strategy has attacked the problem from every angle, including increasing police resources, fostering economic opportunity, improving education outcomes, empowering youth through prevention programs, and creating opportunities for individuals returning from incarceration. The City's approach is showing signs of progress. Chicago closed 2013 with historic lows in crime and violence. Last year, Chicago had the fewest murders since 1965, the lowest murder rate since 1966, and the lowest overall crime rate since 1972. But violence in Chicago remains unacceptably high. Too many families, from generation to generation, have lived with the heartbreak and devastation of gun violence. And while the City continues to invest in smarter police strategies and high quality prevention programs, it also must tackle the problem at one of its root causes: the flow of illegal guns into the City. This report is composed of data and analysis compiled by the Chicago Mayor's Office and the Chicago Police Department examining the impact of illegal guns on violent crime in Chicago and the scope of the City's illegal gun market. This report updates an analysis previously released in 20123 and confirms: (1) Chicago's violence problem is directly linked to the number of illegal guns available in the City; (2) Sixty percent of guns recovered in crimes in Chicago were first sold in other states, many with weaker gun laws; and (3) A small handful of gun stores, three from Cook Country and one from Gary, Indiana, continue to be responsible for a disproportionate number of crime guns recovered on Chicago's streets. Recognizing that there must be a multifaceted approach to reducing gun violence, the Mayor's Office and the Chicago Police Department will take every step to hold accountable the straw purchasers, retail stores, and irresponsible gun owners who arm criminals and young people. Details: Chicago: Office of the Mayor, 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.chicagobusiness.com/Assets/downloads/20151102-Tracing-Guns.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.chicagobusiness.com/Assets/downloads/20151102-Tracing-Guns.pdf Shelf Number: 146278 Keywords: GangsGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal Guns |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Inside Straw Purchasing: How Criminals Get Guns Illegally Summary: This report presents findings from an investigation into one of the main ways criminals get guns: Straw purchases (when one person poses as the buyer of a gun that is actually for someone else). The report was prepared by the Mayors Against Illegal Guns based on investigative work by the James Mintz Group. It presents 12 specific findings showing how some licensed gun dealers sell handguns to illegal traffickers through straw purchases - which could and should be prevented. Details: s.l.: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/12/inside-straw-purchasing-criminals-get-guns-illegally.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/12/inside-straw-purchasing-criminals-get-guns-illegally.pdf Shelf Number: 146986 Keywords: Gun ControlGun TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) Title: CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the Region Summary: I. The ideals of the CARICOM integration movement and the pillars of its foundation can only be realised in a safe and secure Community. The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS) constitutes an historic and defining moment for the Community in clearly articulating its security interests within the wider context of the shifting balance of global geopolitical power, increasing market competitiveness, public debt financing and profound economic uncertainties, threats of climate change and scarcity of key resources.This current situation is further exacerbated by profound influence of new technology and social media, the increasingly asymmetric nature of conflict, and the growing power of non-state actors, including transnational organized crime. II. The multidimensional and multifaceted nature of the risks and threats faced by CARICOM Member States are increasingly interconnected, cross-cutting, network-centric and transnational. The repercussions of emerging threats now propagate rapidly around the world, so that events in any part of the world are now far more likely to have immediate consequences for the Caribbean region. This rapidly - evolving set of security scenarios - and the absence of a common analysis of the risks and threats that affect CARICOM Member States - make this Strategy vitally necessary. III. The Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE) at its 5th Meeting mandated the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) to develop a "Regional Crime and Security Strategy" (hereafter called the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy). IV. The Strategy is guided by the principles and values of democratic choice, freedom, justice, prosperity, respect for territorial integrity, respect for and promotion of human rights and good governance all of which reflect the deepest convictions of the Community. V. The goal of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy is to significantly improve citizen security by creating a safe, just and free Community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the Region. VI. The Strategy identifies and prioritises the common security risks and threats which CARICOM is facing now, and likely to face in the future. It articulates an integrated and cohesive security framework to confront these challenges,and will therefore guide the coordinated internal and external crime and security policies adopted by CARICOM Member States, under their respective legal frameworks to the fullest extent. VII. The risks and threats identified in the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy are prioritised into four (4) Tiers: • Tier 1 -Immediate Significant Threats. These are high-probability, high-impact events. They are the currentand present dangers. • Tier 2 - Substantial Threats. These are both likely and high-impact, but are not as severe as Tier 1 Threats. • Tier 3 - Significant Potential Risks. These are high-impact, but low-probability. • Tier 4 - Future Risks. These are threats where the probability and impact cannot be assessed at this stage. VIII. Tier 1 Threats consist of the mutually-reinforcing relationship between transnational organised criminal activities involving illicit drugs and illegal guns; gangs and organised crime; cyber-crime; financial crimes and corruption. Tier 1 Threats are the main drivers of current criminality levels, and has the potential to cripple the already fragile socio-economic developmental progress in CARICOM and the advancement of CSME. Tier 1 Threats are the Immediate Significant Threats to the Community and are primarily responsible for the Caribbean having one of the highest homicide rates in the world -30 people killed for every 100,000 inhabitants; (compared to a world average of 5). IX. The criminality perpetuated by the Tier 1 Threats is driven by the desire and pursuit of profit, power and prestige. The criminals are supported by the facilitatorswhich consist of unscrupulous and corrupt professionals within key sectors of the economy such as the financial, legal, justice, law enforcement and security, public officials and even government officialswho help them to secure and conceal their assets. X. Organised crime depends on the facilitators of criminality. It is the facilitators who operate both in the licit and illicit world who shield organised crime and allow it to flourish. There are also a range of social factors that enable and support this criminality, including large economic disparities, poverty, the rising cost of living, social exclusion and marginalisation, unemployment and multiple governance failures. XI. Tier 2 Threats are Substantial Threats to the Region. They include human trafficking and smuggling, natural disasters and public disorder crimes. XII. Tier 3 Risks consist of Significant Potential Risks and include attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorism. XIII. Tier 4 Risks consist of Future Risks, with unknown probabilities and consequences. They include climate change, pandemics and migratory pressure. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Caribbean URL: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf Shelf Number: 146969 Keywords: Financial CrimesGangsHuman TraffickingIllegal GunsIllicit DrugsOrganized CrimePublic Disorder |
Author: Parsons, Chelsea Title: Stolen Guns in America: A State-by-State Analysis Summary: In the early morning hours of July 5, 2017, New York Police Department officer Miosotis Familia was ambushed as she sat in a marked NYPD command truck with her partner while providing additional security to a Bronx neighborhood after Fourth of July festivities. In an attack that police officials described as an assassination, Officer Familia was fatally shot in the head with a gun that had been stolen in Charleston, West Virginia, four years earlier. Less than a month earlier on the other side of the country, a UPS driver in San Francisco shot and killed three co-workers and injured two others using a gun that had been stolen in Utah. The shooter was also armed with a gun that had been stolen in Napa County, California. Stolen guns pose a significant risk to community safety. Whether stolen from a gun store or an individual gun owner's collection, these guns often head straight into the illegal underground gun market, where they are sold, traded, and used to facilitate violent crimes. Gun theft is not a minor problem in the United States. According to data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), during the four-year period from 2012 to 2015, nearly half a billion dollars worth of guns were stolen from individuals nationwide, amounting to an estimated 1.2 million guns. Twenty-two thousand guns were stolen from gun stores during this same period. A gun is stolen in the U.S. every two minutes. This problem does not affect all states equally. The rate and volume of guns stolen from both gun stores and private collections vary widely from state to state. From 2012 through 2015, the average rate of the five states with the highest rates of gun theft from private owners - Tennessee, Arkansas, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Alabama - was 13 times higher than the average rate of the five states with the lowest rates - Hawaii, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and Massachusetts. Similarly, from 2012 through 2016, the average rate of the five states with the highest rates of guns stolen from gun stores was 18 times higher than the average rate the five states with the lowest rates. Gun owners and dealers have a substantial responsibility to take reasonable measures to protect against theft and help ensure that their guns do not become part of this illegal inventory. This report analyzes data from the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to provide state-by-state data on the frequency with which guns are stolen from licensed gun dealers and individual gun owners in communities across the country. It then offers a number of policy solutions to help prevent future gun thefts. States that are in the top 10 for highest number of guns stolen from both gun stores and private owners Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2017 at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/07/25052308/StolenGuns-report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/07/25052308/StolenGuns-report.pdf Shelf Number: 146628 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceGunsIllegal GunsStolen GunsTheft |
Author: Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence Title: Keeping Illegal Guns Out of Dangerous Hands: America's Deadly Relinquishment Gap Summary: Americans overwhelmingly agree that it's common sense to prevent dangerous people from accessing deadly weapons-yet there's a dangerous gap in our laws that makes it easy for armed felons and violent criminals to illegally keep their guns after they're convicted. In our new report, Keeping Illegal Guns Out of Dangerous Hands: America's Deadly Relinquishment Gap, we researched relinquishment laws in all 50 states and identified a series of best practices lawmakers can adopt to save lives from gun violence and close this deadly loophole. An essential step to keeping Americans safe from gun violence is to ensure that armed individuals convicted of serious crimes simply turn in, sell, or otherwise rid themselves of their weapons after conviction. In California, law enforcement reported that in 2014 alone, more than 3,200 people illegally kept their guns after a new criminal conviction, many of whom went on to commit crimes with those guns. Relinquishment laws would help prevent this. California, which has the most progressive gun violence prevention laws in the nation, has acted to close this gap in one important way-the state has enacted a law that lays out clear, mandatory procedures for the relinquishment of guns by domestic abusers under a restraining order. Importantly, this law has teeth: it requires these abusers to provide receipts to a judge verifying that they sold or transferred their guns as required. But, the state hasn't extended this best practice to the criminal context, even for people convicted of domestic abuse crimes. Our research on gun relinquishment also revealed: States often rely on the honor system to manage the relinquishment process, trusting violent criminals and other prohibited people to voluntarily turn in their weapons. It costs taxpayers millions of dollars each year - $285 million in California alone-when prohibited people like violent felons are picked up on weapons charges and subsequently incarcerated, and many return to prison because they kept their guns illegally. Only five states provide any statutory process for disarming people prohibited from having guns-Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania The firearm relinquishment gap puts Americans in all 50 states at grave risk. Keeping Illegal Guns Out of Dangerous Hands aims to address the challenge of relinquishment and to encourage lawmakers to establish best practices and mandatory procedures to stem the tide of illegal weapons in our communities. We hope this report will help provide a path to effective gun violence prevention for lawmakers, so fewer Americans fall victim to heartbreaking, preventable shootings. Details: San Francisco: The Center, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 23, 2018 at: http://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Keeping-Guns-Out-of-Dangerous-Hands.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Keeping-Guns-Out-of-Dangerous-Hands.pdf Shelf Number: 148909 Keywords: Gun Control PolicyGun PolicyGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceGunsIllegal Guns |
Author: Parakilas, Jacob Title: The Devil's Trade: Guns and Violence in El Salvador Summary: El Salvador is a country with a troubled past and a troubled present. It is home to two of the most powerful and violent criminal gangs in the world - the Calle 18 and the Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13). And it is haunted by the constant presence of violence. Ravaged by a civil war in the 1980s and 90s, this Central American nation has the highest concentration of gang members of all of the 'Northern Triangle' countries - and its homicide and gun violence rates are shockingly high - well above global averages. In 2011, El Salvador, this country of just over six million , saw nearly 70 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. That year it had over 4,000 homicides, just under half the number of murders seen in the US, a country over fifty times its size.3 El Salvador is not just a country haunted by violent death. It is also a country where the gun is ubiquitous. In 2011, 70 per cent of homicides there were at the end of a gun. And thousands more are seriously wounded by gunfire every year. Despite a gang truce in 2012 between the Calle 18 and the MS-13, violence in El Salvador remains an ugly part of everyday life there. Understanding how guns end up in the hands of criminals is vital if we are to begin to understand something about the daily horrors of shootings and murders. Yet very little research has been done on arms trafficking anywhere south of the US-Mexico border. In this report, THE DEVIL'S TRADE, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) travelled to El Salvador and found that the number of illegal guns in El Salvador matches, and probably vastly exceeds, the estimated 250,000 legitimately owned guns in the country. It also found that obstacles and resistance from those with financial interests in the gun trade have crushed any attempts at firearms law reform. And that corruption in the sectors of the government responsible for gun law enforcement is rampant. THE DEVIL'S TRADE also found that very few guns are being successfully removed from circulation in El Salvador - or in Central America generally. Even confiscated weapons often make their way back into illicit circulation. With such access to weapons, Salvadoran criminal groups' ability to commit widespread violence with impunity remains uncontested, and will continue to grow for the foreseeable future despite attempts to broker a truce among the gangs. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2018 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/the_devils_trade_lr.pdf Year: 2014 Country: El Salvador URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/the_devils_trade_lr.pdf Shelf Number: 148932 Keywords: Arms Trafficking Gangs Gun Violence Gun-Related Violence Homicides Illegal GunsMurders Trafficking in Weapons Violent Crime |
Author: Cook County Gun Violence Task Force (GVTF) Title: Final Report: Findings and Recommendations Summary: The City of Chicago and Cook County are both engulfed in a crisis of gun violence and the availability of illegal guns in Chicago and Cook County has continued to fuel this crisis. In recent years, Chicago's homicide rate has hovered around 500 homicides per year. However, the city has already seen more than 700 homicides by late November - a reversal of the progress the city has made toward reducing gun violence during the past two decades. As the crisis and growing rate of gun violence in the City of Chicago and across Cook County has intensified, however, the issue has become better-documented every year. As a result, the GVTF was convened to examine the current gun violence crisis, its underlying causes, and assess various evidence-based programs, policies, and practices as potential solutions for combatting the continued growth of gun crimes and violence across Chicago and Cook County. In the past decade, over 50,000 African-American men were victims of firearm homicides in the United States. Despite the City of Chicago having a population that is as much as three times smaller, the Chicago Police Department recovers more guns than New York and Los Angeles combined, as well as also recording a greater number of shooting victims each year. In 2015, according to the Chicago Tribune, there were 2,900 shooting victims in the City of Chicago alone. During the same period, the city of New York and its police department reported having only 1,300 shooting victims-less than half of what Chicago recorded. Thus far, in 2016, there have been more than 3,900 people shot in the City of Chicago, and more than 700 people have been killed as a result of gun violence. Three quarters of the victims of shootings in Chicago are African-Americans. They are heavily concentrated in 10-20 high-crime areas on the city's South and West sides. A disturbing number of these victims are innocent children who get in the way when criminals target rivals. Homicides that result from gun violence account for only one half of an otherwise incomplete picture, however. Too often forgotten during discussions about firearm violence are the many non-fatal shootings that comprise the other half of the picture. Each year, approximately 900 individual victims of gun violence are treated at Stroger Hospital by the physicians of the Cook County Health and Hospital System. The cost to taxpayers for treatment can typically range between $35,000 and $50,000 per victim, or in cases of serious debilitating nonfatal injuries, the costs can total up to $250,000 for the first year and $200,000 each year thereafter. These local statistics paint a stark picture for the City of Chicago and Cook County. Nationally, we have seen instances of firearm violence draw increased attention in the wake of tragic recent events. Despite this increased attention, however, there has been limited action by the federal government, to take concrete steps toward addressing the increase in firearm violence and its surrounding issues. Frustration with congressional gridlock over efforts to combat gun violence, however, should not stop local government and law enforcement from doing what it can to reduce this growing problem. It is imperative that local stakeholders begin to recognize and acknowledge that there are ways to combat community violence and save lives that have little or nothing to do with either regulating firearms and enacting expensive, grand solutions-both of which have proven to be equally unrealistic and unsuccessful endeavors in spite of an escalating number of incidents of violence across the country. An important part of this recognition process is coming to understand that discussions surrounding violence, criminal justice reforms, and community economic development are not separate and unrelated issues. Instead, these issues are each a critical component of intrinsically interconnected problems that all stakeholders must begin to address through comprehensive and coordinated programs, policies, and practices that focus on proven evidence-based solutions. Successful implementation of comprehensive and coordinated proven evidence-based solutions will not be easy, nor will it take place over night. Doing so will require greater public attention, as well as some funding. More importantly, focusing the energies of everyone involved on the evidence-based programs, policies, and practices that have been proven to succeed in addressing all aspects of community violence and its underlying causes will take strong commitment, discipline, compromise, and an unrelenting dedication from all stakeholders. Ultimately, however, through the adoption and implementation of successful evidence-based policy programs and practices the number of firearm crimes and associated incidents of violence could be significantly reduced and prevented across the City of Chicago and Cook County Details: Chicago: GVTF, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: http://richardrboykin.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The-Cook-County-Gun-Violence-Task-Force-Final-Report-2016-3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://richardrboykin.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The-Cook-County-Gun-Violence-Task-Force-Final-Report-2016-3.pdf Shelf Number: 148965 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal GunsMurders |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives Summary: Objectives -- The objectives of this audit were to evaluate: (1) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives; (2) ATF compliance with policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of ATF's weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories. The audit covers ATF's weapons and munitions inventories, including firearms, Tasers, ammunition, chemical agents, diversionary devices, and explosives, as well as seized weapons, ammunition, and explosives inventories from fiscal years (FY) 2014 through 2017. To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed ATF personnel, evaluated ATF's policies regarding property management, firearms, ammunition, explosives, and diversionary devices. We also reviewed documentation related to firearms that were reported as lost or stolen during the scope of our audit to determine whether ATF took appropriate action. Finally, we assessed compliance with ATF policy and conducted physical inventories at 16 ATF locations. Results in Brief -- We found that ATF generally has strong physical controls over ATF-owned firearms and explosives. We also found that ATF has strong inventory controls over its firearms. However, we identified deficiencies related to munitions tracking, the accuracy of ATF's munitions inventories, and compliance with munitions and explosives policy. We also identified areas where ATF's policies should be strengthened to improve the safeguarding and accountability of ATF-owned and seized weapons and munitions. Recommendations Our report contains 10 recommendations to improve ATF's controls over its ammunition, explosives, less lethal munitions, as well as its seized weapons and ammunition. ATF's response to the draft report appears in Appendix 2 and our analysis of the response, as well as a summary of actions necessary to close the recommendations, appears in Appendix 3 of this report. Details: Washington, DC: OIG, 2018. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 18-21: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1821.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1821.pdf Shelf Number: 149756 Keywords: Firearms and WeaponsIllegal GunsIllegal WeaponsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Everytown for Gun Safety Title: Danger in the Land of Enchantment: Investigating online gun sales in New Mexico Summary: In October 2016, a violent felon from Deming tried to buy a gun. He had recently served time in prison for three felonies related to a domestic violence incident: armed with a revolver, he choked his fiancee, told her he would break her neck, and tried to force her into the trunk of her car.1 His felony convictions made it illegal for him to buy or possess firearms - but now he was online and actively shopping for a Glock handgun. If he had tried to buy one at a licensed dealer, where background checks are legally required, his felony convictions would have blocked the sale. Instead, he turned to online ads - where, because of a loophole in the law in New Mexico, gun sales can be arranged with no background check required. Policymakers have long recognized that it's dangerous for people with a felony conviction, a history of domestic abuse, or serious mental illness to have guns.2 People with such records, like the man described above, are legally prohibited from buying or possessing guns. That's why licensed gun dealers - Walmart, Dick's Sporting Goods, or any of the hundreds of local gun stores across New Mexico - are legally required to contact the background check system to run a check on every buyer. When someone who is not allowed to have a gun attempts to make a purchase, the background check blocks the sale. But there's a problem with this system. In New Mexico, because of a dangerous loophole in the law - referred to as the background check loophole - background checks are not required when guns are sold by individuals who are not licensed dealers.3 These sales are called "unlicensed" gun sales, and they aren't just taking place between friends or neighbors - they're taking place on the internet. Websites like Armslist.com, the "Craigslist for guns," provide a platform for unlicensed gun sales to be arranged online, between strangers. Because of the background check loophole, criminals can turn to these online unlicensed sales to arm themselves illegally, no background check required, no questions asked. To understand how often criminals in New Mexico take advantage of the background check loophole to buy guns in unlicensed online sales, Everytown investigators (1) examined the size of the state's unlicensed online sale market, and (2) posted for-sale ads online, tracking how many responses were from New Mexicans prohibited by law from buying or possessing firearms. Details: New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2017. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EGS-031-NewMexico_5a_020817.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EGS-031-NewMexico_5a_020817.pdf Shelf Number: 149787 Keywords: Background ChecksFirearmsGun Control PolicyIllegal Guns |